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Abstract
A seminal theorem of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) proves that,
in a game of bilateral trade between a single buyer and a single seller, no
mechanism can be simultaneously individually-rational, budget-balanced,
incentive-compatible and socially-efficient. However, the impossibility dis-
appears if the price is fixed exogenously and the social-efficiency goal is
subject to individual-rationality at the given price.
We show that the impossibility comes back if there are multiple units
of the same good, or multiple types of goods, even when the prices are
fixed exogenously. Particularly, if there are M units of the same good or
M kinds of goods, for some M ≥ 2, then no truthful mechanism can guar-
antee more than 1/M of the optimal gain-from-trade. In the single-good
multi-unit case, if both agents have submodular valuations (decreasing
marginal returns), then no truthful mechanism can guarantee more than
1/HM of the optimal gain-from-trade, where HM is the M -th harmonic
number (HM ≈ lnM + 1/2). All upper bounds are tight.
1 Introduction
Consider a market with two agents: a seller and a buyer. The seller holds an
item for sale and the buyer considers buying this item. The seller values the
item as s and the buyer values it as b. The utilities of both agents are quasi-
linear in money. If s < b then there is a potential gain-from-trade (GFT) —
if the seller sells the item to the buyer then the social welfare will increase by
b− s. We look for a mechanism that asks the agents to report their values and
implements this optimal GFT. The mechanism should satisfy four properties:
• Efficiency — the increase in social welfare should be max(0, b− s).
• Budget balance (BB) — the mechanism designer should not lose.
• Individual rationality (IR) — the utility of each agent should not decrease.
• Dominant-strategy incentive-compatibility (DSIC)— it should be a weakly-
dominant strategy for each agent to report his true value.
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It is easy to construct mechanisms that satisfy each three of these four proper-
ties. However, a classic paper of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) proves that
it is impossible to satisfy all four properties simultaneously. Intuitively, the
reason is that it is impossible to truthfully determine prices for trading: if the
mechanism pays the seller ps < b, the seller is incentivized to bid e.g. (ps+ b)/2
to force the price up; similarly, if the mechanism charges the buyer pb > s, the
buyer is incentivized to bid (pb + s)/2 to force the price down. DSIC can be
guaranteed by setting ps = b and pb = s (this is the two-sided variant of the
Vickrey auction (Vickrey, 1961)) but this mechanism is not BB since it leaves
the mechanism designer with a deficit of b− s.
Now consider a market in which a price p is fixed exogenously, e.g. by
the government. Fixing a price automatically guarantees budget-balance, since
all monetary transfers are between buyers and sellers. We are interested in
incentive-compatibility and efficiency subject to individual-rationality, i.e, we
want the buyer to buy the item if-and-only-if b ≥ p ≥ s. In this case the
Myerson–Satterthwaite impossibility disappears. It is trivial to attain all these
properties using the following simple mechanism: ask the agents to report their
values and perform the trade iff b ≥ p ≥ s.
But this trivial mechanism works only when there is a single unit of a single
good. We are interested in the following question:
In a market with a single buyer, a single seller and two or more
items with exogenously-fixed prices, is it possible to attain incentive-
compatibility and efficiency subject to individual-rationality?
Our main result is that this is impossible. We quantify the impossibility using
the notion of a competitive ratio of a mechanism — the worst-case ratio of its
GFT to the optimal GFT. We present three upper bounds on the competitive
ratio:
1. If the seller holds M different kinds of goods and the buyer wants one
good, then the competitive ratio of any DSIC mechanism is at most 1/M .
2. If the seller holds M units of the same good, then the competitive ratio
of any DSIC mechanism is at most 1/M .
3. If the seller holds M units of the same good, and it is public knowledge
that both the seller and the buyer have submodular valuations (decreasing
marginal returns), then the competitive ratio of any DSIC mechanism is at
most 1/HM , where HM is theM -th harmonic number (HM ≈ lnM+1/2).
All these upper bounds are tight: they are attained by trivial mechanisms that
ignore the agents’ bids and determine the trade randomly.
The results are proved as special cases of a general model about bilateral
cooperation. This model is presented in Section 2. The results on cooperation
with general valuations are proved in Section 3. The result on cooperation
with submodular valuations is proved in Section 4. The corollaries to bilateral
trading are proved in Section 5.
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2 Model
There are two agents that we call “buyer” and “seller”. They consider M
options for cooperation, numbered 1, . . . ,M . If option i is selected, then the
buyer’s utility is bi and the seller’s utility is si, which can be positive zero or
negative. These utilities are their private information. Additionally, there is an
option 0 which means no cooperation; we assume that b0 = s0 = 0.
An outcome i is called feasible if both bi ≥ 0 and si ≥ 0. Denote the set of
feasible outcomes by Feasible:
Feasible(b, s) := {i|bi ≥ 0 and si ≥ 0}
Note that Feasible(b, s) is never empty since it contains 0.
The optimal utility of a feasible outcome is denoted by OPT:
OPT (b, s) := max
i∈Feasible(b,s)
bi + si
Bilateral trade is a special case of this general model.
Example 2.1. A seller holds M units of a single good and values each bundle
of i units as σi; a potential buyer values each bundle of i units as βi. The
price-per-unit is p and both agents have utility functions quasi-linear in money.
Then, bi = βi − p · i and si = p · i + σM−i − σM and OPT is the maximum
potential GFT (since we normalize the seller’s utility from no cooperation to
zero).
Example 2.2. A seller holds a set M containing M different goods, a single
unit of each good. The seller has an arbitrary valuation function over bundles
of goods: σi(X) is the seller’s value for bundle X . The buyer has a unit-demand
valuation function: he values each item i as βi and is interested in buying at
most one item. The price of item i is fixed at pi. Then, bi = βi − pi and
si = pi + σ(M \ {i})− σ(M) and OPT is again the maximum potential GFT.
Our goal is to design a mechanism that approximates OPT.
A mechanism is a function r that receives as input the reported valuations of
the agents, b′ = (b′1, . . . , b
′
M ), s
′ = (s′1, . . . , s
′
M ). These reports may be different
than the true valuations b = (b1, . . . , bM ), s = (s1, . . . , sM ). The output of the
mechanism, r(b′, s′), is a vector of M +1 probabilities — a probability for each
option including option 0. The probability of option i is denoted by ri(b
′, s′),
and
∑M
i=0 ri(b
′, s′) = 1.
The expected gain of the buyer is:
Br(b
′, s′) =
M∑
i=0
ri(b
′, s′) · bi =
M∑
i=1
ri(b
′, s′) · bi
and the expected gain of the seller is:
Sr(b
′, s′) =
M∑
i=0
ri(b
′, s′) · si =
M∑
i=1
ri(b
′, s′) · si
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and the expected gain of the mechanism is:
Gr(b
′, s′) =
M∑
i=1
ri(b
′, s′) · (bi + si)
Definition 2.3. Amechanism r is calledDominant-Strategy Incentive-Compatible
(DSIC) — if for each agent, revealing the true values is a weakly-dominant strat-
egy:
∀b, b′, s, s′ : Br(b, s
′) ≥ Br(b
′, s′) and Sr(b
′, s) ≥ Sr(b
′, s′)
If the mechanism r is DSIC, we assume that b′ = b and s′ = s, so the
mechanism gain is Gr(b, s). The competitive ratio of a DSIC mechanism is:
Cr := min
b,s
Gr(b, s)
OPT (b, s)
3 General utilities
Consider the following simple mechanism.
Example 3.1. The Uniform-Random (UR) mechanism chooses an option i ∈
{1, . . . ,M} with uniform probability, ri = 1/M for all i, regardless of b
′ and
s′. It then lets the agents decide whether they want option i or nothing. The
agents will cooperate iff bi ≥ 0, si ≥ 0. Therefore, the expected gain is
GUR(b, s) =
∑
i∈Feasible(b,s)
bi + si
M
≥
OPT (b, s)
M
This lower bound is tight, since it is possible that that all positive gain comes
from a single option. Therefore, CUR = 1/M .
Our first theorem shows that, when the agents can have general utility func-
tions, no DSIC mechanism can be better than the uniform-random mechanism.
Theorem 3.2. When there are M options, every DSIC mechanism has an
expected competitive ratio of at most 1/M .
The following lemma will be used several times in the proof.
Lemma 3.3. Let r be a DSIC mechanism with competitive ratio α. Then, for
every b, s:
M∑
i=1
ri(b, s) · bi ≥ α · max
i∈Feasible(b,s)
bi
M∑
i=1
ri(b, s) · si ≥ α · max
i∈Feasible(b,s)
si
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Proof. Consider the alternative report vector b′ = L · b, where L is a very large
number (sufficiently large such that L · bi + si ≈ L · bi for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}).
Note that Feasible(b′, s) = Feasible(b, s). If the true values are (b′, s), then
almost all gain comes from the buyer’s values, so:
Gr(b
′, s) ≈
M∑
i=1
ri(b
′, s) · L · bi
OPT (b′, s) ≈ max
i∈Feasible(b,s)
L · bi
Since the competitive ratio is α, we must haveGr(b
′, s) ≥ αOPT (b′, s). Dividing
both sides by L yields:
M∑
i=1
ri(b
′, s) · bi ≥ α · max
i∈Feasible(b,s)
bi (*)
If the buyer’s true valuations are b but he reports b′, his expected gain is exactly
the left-hand side of (*). Therefore, a DSIC mechanism must guarantee that
the buyer gets the same utility by reporting truthfully b. Hence:
M∑
i=1
ri(b, s) · bi ≥ α · max
i∈Feasible(b,s)
bi
as claimed. The proof for the seller is analogous.
We now apply Lemma 3.3 to utility vectors from a special family. For every
d ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, let Bd be the family of vectors b with:
bi = 1 when i ∈ {1, . . . , d}
bi ≤ 0 when i ∈ {d+ 1, . . . ,M}
For every constant ε≪ 1, let sε be a vector with:
sεi = ε
M−i
Lemma 3.4. Let r be a DSIC mechanism with competitive ratio α. Then, for
every d, every b ∈ Bd and every ε ∈ (0, 1):
d∑
i=1
ri(b, s
ε) ≥ d · (α− 2ε)
Proof. The proof is by induction on d.
For d = 1, we have b1 = 1 and all other bi’s are zero or negative. Apply
Lemma 3.3 to the buyer:
r1(b, s
ε) · b1 +
M∑
i=2
ri(b, s
ε) · bi ≥α · b1
=⇒ r1(b, s
ε) ≥α ≥ 1 · (α− 2ε)
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We now assume the claim is true for d− 1 and prove it is true for d. Let b
be any vector in Bd. Consider the alternative buyer’s valuation b′, with:
b′i =


1 i ∈ {1, . . . , d− 1}
0 i = d
−1/εM i ∈ {d+ 1, . . . ,M}
So the gain in options d+1, . . . ,M is dominated by −1/εM . We claim that the
probability with which the mechanism selects one of these options is negligible.
Let rD :=
∑M
i=d+1 ri(b
′, sε). Then, when the true valuations are b′, sε:
Gr ≤ (1 − rD) · 1− rD/ε
M
If the competitive ratio of r is positive, then Gr must be positive, which implies
rD < ε
M .
Now, apply Lemma 3.3 to the seller :
d∑
i=1
ri(b
′, sε) · εM−i +
M∑
i=d+1
ri(b
′, sε) · εM−i ≥ α · εM−d
=⇒
d∑
i=1
ri(b
′, sε) · εM−i ≥ α · εM−d − rD
=⇒
d∑
i=1
ri(b
′, sε) · εd−i ≥ α− εd
=⇒ rd(b
′, sε) ≥ α−
d−1∑
i=1
ri(b
′, sε) · εd−i − εd
=⇒ rd(b
′, sε) ≥ α− 2ε
Note that b′ ∈ Bd−1. Hence, by the induction assumption:
d−1∑
i=1
ri(b
′, sε) ≥ (d− 1) · (α− 2ε)
Summing the above two inequalities gives:
d∑
i=1
ri(b
′, sε) ≥ d · (α− 2ε)
If the buyer’s true valuation is b but he deviates and reports b′, he is guaranteed
a utility of at least d · (α− 2ε). Therefore, a DSIC mechanism must guarantee
the buyer at least the same utility from reporting truthfully b. Hence:
d∑
i=1
ri(b, s
ε) ≥ d · (α− 2ε)
verifying the induction claim for d.
6
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Apply Lemma 3.4 with d = M . It implies that every
DSIC mechanism with approximation factor at least αmust have
∑M
i=1 ri(b, s
ε) ≥
M · (α − 2ε) for every b ∈ BM . But the sum of all M probabilities must be
at most 1. Therefore, α ≤ 1/M + 2ε. This is true for every ε ∈ (0, 1), so
α ≤ 1/M .
4 Submodular utilities
In this section, we assume that the utility vectors of both agents satisfy the
condition of decreasing marginal returns, which is equivalent to submodularity:
Definition 4.1. A utility vector v1, . . . , vM is submodular if, for every i ∈
{1, . . . ,M − 1}:
vi+1 − vi ≤ vi − vi−1
In the case of multi-unit bilateral trade (Example 2.1), it is clear that if the
buyer’s utility function βi is submodular, then his utility vector bi is submodular
too. It can be checked that the same is true for the seller: if σi is submodu-
lar then si is submodular too. We now present a randomized mechanism for
submodular agents.
Example 4.2. The Decreasing Random (DR) mechanism chooses each option
i ∈ {1, . . . ,M} with probability:
ri :=
1
i ·HM
where HM is the M -th harmonic number:
HM :=
M∑
j=1
1
j
∈ [lnM +
1
M
, lnM + 1]
It then lets the agents decide whether they want option i or nothing. The agents
will cooperate iff bi ≥ 0, si ≥ 0. Therefore, the expected gain is:
GDR(b, s) =
∑
i∈Feasible(b,s)
bi + si
i ·HM
Suppose both the buyer and the seller have submodular utilities. Let vi :=
bi + si. Then the vector vi is submodular too, and this implies that for every
i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}:
vi+1
i + 1
≤
vi
i
7
Therefore, for every k ∈ {1, . . . ,M}:
GDR(b, s) ≥
∑
i∈{1,...,k}
vi
i ·HM
≥
∑
i∈{1,...,k}
vk
k ·HM
= k
vk
k ·HM
=
vk
HM
This is true in particular for the option k in which OPT is attained. Therefore,
GDR(b, s) ≥ OPT/HM .
This inequality is tight. For example, we might have, for all i, bi = i and
si = 0 (both are submodular). Then, the optimal gain is M while GDR(b, s) =
M
HM
. Therefore, CDR = 1/HM .
Our next theorem shows that, even when the agents’ utilities are known to
be submodular, no DSIC mechanism can be better than the decreasing-random
mechanism.
Theorem 4.3. When there are M options, every DSIC mechanism that works
for arbitrary submodular valuations has an expected competitive ratio of at most
1/HM .
We will prove the theorem by applying Lemma 3.3 to utility vectors from a
special family. For every d ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, let Bd∗ be the family of submodular
vectors b with:
b1 ≥ · · · ≥ bd > 0 ≥ bd+1 ≥ · · · ≥ bM
Let s∗ be a vector with: s∗i = i for all i (note that s
∗ is submodular too).
Lemma 4.4. Let r be a DSIC mechanism with competitive ratio α. Then, for
every d and for every b ∈ Bd∗ :
d∑
i=1
ri(b, s
∗) · bi ≥ α ·
d∑
i=1
bi
i
Proof. The proof is by induction on d.
For d = 1, we have b1 = 1 and bi≥2 ≤ 0. Applying Lemma 3.3 to the buyer
gives r1(b, s
∗) · b1 ≥ α · b1.
We now assume the claim is true for d− 1 and prove it is true for d. Let b
be any vector in Bd∗ . Consider the alternative vector b
′, with:
b′i =
{
bi −
i
d
· bd i ∈ {1, . . . , d}
−1/εM i ∈ {d+ 1, . . . ,M}
where ε is a very small number. By arguments similar to Lemma 3.4, when ε
is sufficiently small, any mechanism with positive competitive ratio must select
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any option i ∈ {d+ 1, . . . ,M} with negligible probability. So, applying Lemma
3.3 to the seller gives:
d∑
i=1
ri(b
′, s∗) · i ≥ s∗d · α = α · d
=⇒
d∑
i=1
ri(b
′, s∗) ·
i
d
· bd ≥ α · bd (1)
Since b is submodular, and the number we subtract from every bi grows with
i, b′ is submodular too. Moreover,
b′1 > b
′
2 > · · · b
′
d = 0 > b
′
d+1 > · · · > b
′
M
Therefore, b′ ∈ Bd−1 and we can apply the induction assumption:
d−1∑
i=1
ri(b
′, s∗) · b′i ≥ α ·
d−1∑
i=1
b′i
i
(2)
Note that b′d = 0, so we can start the summation in the left-hand side from d
and it will not change. Summing up inequalities (1) and (2) yields:
d∑
i=1
ri(b
′, s∗) · (b′i +
i
d
· bd) ≥ α ·
(
bd +
d−1∑
i=1
b′i
i
)
=⇒
d∑
i=1
ri(b
′, s∗) · bi ≥ α ·
(
bd +
d−1∑
i=1
(
bi
i
−
bd
d
)
)
=⇒
d∑
i=1
ri(b
′, s∗) · bi ≥ α ·
d∑
i=1
bi
i
(3)
If the buyer’s true valuation is b but he deviates and reports b′, his utility is the
left-hand side of (3). A DSIC mechanism must guarantee the buyer at least the
same utility from reporting truthfully b. Hence:
d∑
i=1
ri(b, s
∗) · bi ≥ α ·
d∑
i=1
bi
i
verifying the induction claim for d.
Proof of Theorem 4.3. Consider the utility vector b in which bi = 1 for all i.
Note that b ∈ BM∗ so it is eligible to Lemma 4.4. Hence:
M∑
i=1
ri(b, s
∗) ≥ α ·
M∑
i=1
1
i
= α ·HM
But the sum of probabilities is at most 1, so α ≤ 1/HM as claimed.
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5 Bilateral Trade
In this section we prove two corollaries of Theorem 3.2 for two settings of bilat-
eral trading.
Corollary 5.1. A seller holds M units of a single good. The seller values each
bundle of i units as σi and a potential buyer values each bundle of i units as
βi. The price-per-unit p is fixed exogenously. Both agents have utility functions
quasi-linear in money. Then, the competitive ratio of any DSIC mechanism is:
• at most 1/M with general valuations, and:
• at most 1/HM with submodular valuations.
Proof. Apply Theorems 3.2 and 4.3 with bi = βi − p · i and si = p · i+ σM−i −
σM .
Remark 5.2. Obviously there are special cases in which Corollary 5.1 does not
hold. For example, if it is public knowledge that the utilities of both the buyer
and the seller are additive (i.e, βi = i · β1 and σi = i · σ1 for all i), then the
following mechanism is DSIC: ask the agents to report β1 and σ1; tradeM units
iff β1 ≥ p ≥ σ1.
Corollary 5.3. A seller holds a set M containing M different goods, a single
unit of each good. The seller has an arbitrary valuation function over bundles of
goods: σi(X) is the seller’s value for bundle X. The buyer has a unit-demand
valuation function: he values each item i as βi and is interested in buying at
most one item. Then, the competitive ratio of any DSIC mechanism is at most
1/M .
Proof. Apply Theorem 3.2 with bi = βi− pi and si = pi+σ(M{i})−σ(M).
Remark 5.4. Corollary 5.3 holds even if it is public knowledge that the seller
has an additive valuation function. However, it does not hold if both the seller
and the buyer are additive. In this case, it is possible to trade in each item-type
separately using a simple mechanism: trade iff βi ≥ pi ≥ σi.
6 Conclusion
We presented impossibility theorems on impossibility of truthful cooperation in
general. Applying these theorems to Examples 2.1 and 2.2 yields impossibility
results on bilateral trade with fixed prices.
Our general results about impossibility of cooperation can potentially be
extended in two ways.
1. We assumed that the mechanism is not allowed to charge money — so it
must be strongly-budget-balanced. What happens if we allow the mechanism to
charge or pay money, but require that it remains weakly-budget-balanced (no
deficit)?
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2. We required the mechanism to be dominant-strategy IC. What happens if
we allow it to be IC only in Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, like the original theorem
of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983)?
The applications to bilateral trade can also be extended. Suppose there are
M different kinds of goods and the buyer is not unit-demand? If the valuations
are arbitrary, then our general impossibility implies that the competitive ratio
can be at most 1/2M . What is the upper bound when the agents’ valuations
are sub-additive? sub-modular? gross-substitute?
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